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ABSTRACT 
 
This article reports the results of a laboratory experiment that investigated differences in trust and 
trustworthiness between Americans and Croatians. Contrary to the majority of previous cross-
cultural studies, this experiment implemented a design that allowed participants to simultaneously 
interact with subjects from the other country. Additionally, it analyzed changes in their levels of 
trust and trustworthiness when information about the nationality of a subject’s counterpart was 
not revealed. The main findings are: 1) Overall, Croatians trusted more than Americans did, but 
Americans were more trustworthy, 2) Subjects from both nationalities trusted less when they knew 
they were paired with somebody from another country, compared to when they interacted with 
someone from the same country, 3) Croatians also became less trustworthy when they were paired 
with an American, but Americans became more trustworthy when they were paired with a 
Croatian, and 4) Uncertainty about the nationality of one’s counterpart reduced both trust and 
trustworthiness for both nationalities, a result that suggests that, overall, not knowing the 
nationality of one person caused the subjects to behave as if this person was of a different 
nationality. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
ecent advances in behavioral and experimental economics have expanded our understanding of 
human behavior in social interactions. Both laboratory and field experiments, for example, have 
shown that the model of self-regarding preferences, which assumes that people care only about their 
own material payoffs, cannot account for the observed actions of most subjects in these experiments when they 
faced environments that allowed for cooperation, coordination, bargaining, and trust (Camerer, 2003). These results 
have attracted a lot of attention, especially because they suggest that the basic assumption of purely selfish 
preferences, which has been the building block of many economic models that have tried to investigate social 
outcomes, is, at best, incomplete to explain social outcomes (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2002).  
 
As an alternative to this assumption of purely self-regarding preferences, new theoretical models inspired 
by the results of these experiments have started to introduce other-regarding preferences (a.k.a. social preferences) 
into an agent’s objective function in addition to the standard assumption of selfish motives (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; 
Charness and Rabin, 2002). These models assume, in general, that in many different kinds of social interactions with 
strangers, humans do care about the outcomes, intentions, and actions of others around them, but in a conditional or 
reciprocal manner. The idea of reciprocity stipulates that humans are willing to be nice and cooperative toward those 
who are also being nice and cooperative, but at the same time, we are willing to behave in a hostile manner toward 
those who violate the social norm (Fehr and Gaechter, 2000). It is a propensity to be kind or unkind, conditional on 
the action of others, even when it is costly for us to do so and when there are no opportunities for future interactions 
(Gintis et al., 2008). 
 
Even though a great deal has been learned about social preferences, little is known about other social 
inclinations that may interact with these preferences and that have an enormous influence in our daily lives, such as 
trust, honesty, and cultural conventions. This article addresses the topic of trust and trustworthiness by reporting the 
R 
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results of a series of laboratory experiments in two different countries (United States and Croatia). These 
experiments investigated how different types of interactions in these countries affect the beliefs that agents have 
about the behavior of other agents (from the same nationality and from another nationality). This preferential 
treatment to trust is justified given the importance that trust has in reducing transaction costs in any given economy. 
It is well known that differences in the levels of trust in a specific population are correlated with higher levels of 
economic growth, less income inequality, lower crime rates, and other desirable socioeconomic indicators (Cardenas 
and Carpenter, 2008).
1
 
 
This study makes two methodological contributions to the literature: 1) the subjects had the opportunity to 
simultaneously interact with participants from the other country and 2) one of the treatments introduced uncertainty 
about the nationality of a subject’s counterpart, wherein a person from one nationality was paired with another 
person, but she did not know the nationality of this person (the only information provided was that there was a 50-50 
chance of being paired with one of these two nationalities). To the author’s knowledge, this is the first study to 
combine these two treatments in the analysis of trust.
2
 
 
The introduction of incomplete information about the nationality of one’s counterpart into one of the 
treatments allowed us to answer how beliefs about trust change when this information is not available to the person 
making a decision. In a globalized and highly inter-connected world, the probability of interacting with strangers of 
unknown nationality increases significantly, and when these interactions do occur, opportunities for cooperation and 
trust are usually present. Many cross-cultural experiments investigating trust have been conducted in recent years. 
Most of these studies, however, have not allowed for the simultaneous interaction of people from different countries 
and have not included a treatment with incomplete information. 
 
The main results are:  
 
1. Overall, Croatians trusted more than Americans, but Americans were more trustworthy, especially when 
they knew they were interacting with a subject from Croatia. 
2. Croatians reduced their levels of trust and trustworthiness when they were paired with an American 
compared to their levels of trust when they interacted with another Croatian. 
3. Americans also reduced their levels of trust when they were paired with a Croatian, but surprisingly, they 
became more trustworthy toward a Croatian than when they interacted with another American. 
4. Incomplete information regarding the nationality of the other person reduced both trust and trustworthiness 
in both countries. 
 
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
 
A total of 108 subjects (54 from the United States and 54 from Croatia) participated in this experiment. The 
subjects were members of two institutions of higher education from these two countries (Wofford College, located 
in the United States and the University of Spit, located in Croatia). All treatments were anonymous; i.e., the subjects 
did not know the identity of their counterpart (even when they knew their nationality) and all sessions used 
monetary payoffs to create real incentives for the subjects to take the experiment seriously and to reveal their 
preferences in a more consistent manner. Each session took about 45 minutes to complete and subjects earned, on 
average, $16 each.
3
 Written instructions were provided to all subjects. All treatments were conducted in computer 
labs with the help of software that recorded and reported all decisions made by the subjects. In this paper, we 
acknowledge that even though the results did show a consistent pattern of behavior across treatments, the amount of 
statistical power that we had available was limited given our sample size.  
 
                                                 
1 It is still debatable, however, what the direction of causation is. 
2 The only study that we are aware of that allowed subjects form different countries to interact simultaneously is Boarini et al. 
(2009), which investigated differences of behavior between subjects from India and France using an Ultimatum Game. 
3 Naturally, the final earnings of each subject differed significantly since the final payoffs depended on the decisions made by 
them and their counterparts. 
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Berg et al. (1995) were the first to analyze this two-person sequential game, which allows the investigation 
of trust and trustworthiness in a specific group. In this game, subjects are brought to the lab and divided randomly 
into anonymous pairs (they know they have been paired with somebody, but they do not know who she is). Both 
persons receive an endowment of money. Person A - the first mover - has to decide how much of this endowment to 
transfer to Person B - the second mover. Any integer amount between 0 and the endowment is permitted. The 
amount transferred by Person A to Person B, however, is tripled by the experimenter before reaching the hands of 
Person B. After receiving this tripled amount, Person B decides how much (if any) of the total amount of money that 
she has (the initial endowment she received plus the tripled amount) she wants to transfer back to Person A. The 
amount transferred back to Person A by Person B is not tripled. Consider the following numerical example:  Assume 
that both players start with $10 and Person A chooses to transfer $6 to Person B. Person A now has only $4 and 
Person B has $28 ($10 + (3 x $6)). Person B now has to choose how much of this $28 to transfer back to Person A. 
If Person B chooses to transfer back $3, Person A earns a final payoff of $7 ($4 + $3) and Person B earns a final 
payoff of $25 ($28 - $3). 
 
If one assumes purely self-regarding preferences, the theoretical prediction of this game is straightforward - 
regardless of what Person B receives, she will not transfer anything back to Person A if she is purely selfish because 
she has no obligation of transferring back a positive amount. Using backward induction, Person A anticipates that 
this is what a selfish second mover does and, by being selfish herself, she chooses to transfer nothing to Person B. It 
is important to notice that this prediction generates an inefficient set of payoffs. Both players could be better off if 
Person A had trusted Person B by transferring a positive amount to her and then Person B behaved in a trustworthy 
manner by transferring back to Person A at least the same amount that Person A transferred to her. For example, if 
they both start with $10, the theoretical prediction under self-regarding preferences is that they will both leave the 
experiment with $10; but if Person A transfers all $10 to Person B, Person B will have $40 (10 + (3 x $10)), and if 
Person B decides to transfer $20 back to Person A, they will both leave the experiment with $20, which is an 
outcome superior to both players. 
 
In this game, we measure trust by observing how much first movers choose to transfer to second movers 
and we measure trustworthiness by observing how much second movers transferred back to first movers. 
 
The empirical evidence of the Trust Game shows, in general, that most humans are willing to trust others 
by transferring a positive amount to second movers who, in turn, are usually willing to reciprocate by transferring a 
positive amount back to the first mover, typically enough to give the first mover at least the same payoff that she 
started the game with. However, in addition to this general finding, many studies have found a significant amount of 
cultural variation in this game where subjects from countries with higher rates of GDP growth, lower levels of 
poverty, and less inequality trust others more when they play this game compared to subjects from countries with the 
opposite characteristics (Cardenas and Carpenter, 2005).  
 
Our experimental design implemented the Trust Game using both American and Croatians subjects to 
analyze trust and trustworthiness in three treatments: 1) Same nationality (Americans paired with Americans and 
Croatians paired with Croatians), 2) Other nationality (Americans paired with Croatians and vice-versa), and 3) 
Random pairing with uncertainty about the counterpart’s nationality. Each subject played the same role (first mover 
or second mover) throughout the session and participated once in each treatment (a within-subjects design), which 
added to a total of three decisions per participant per experimental session. In order to avoid ordering effects, first 
movers did not receive immediate feedback about the amount that the second mover transferred back to them in 
each treatment. At the end of the experimental session, a message appeared on the computer screen showing the 
information about what second movers did to first movers in these three treatments. In each treatment, all subjects 
started the game with 10 Experimental Units (EU) (EU 4 = $1). 
 
RESULTS 
 
Trust 
 
As mentioned in the Introduction, in the Trust Game, the amount transferred by the First Mover is an 
indication of the amount of trust that this person has toward an anonymous stranger. If one rules out the possibility 
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of unconditional altruism in this game (giving a positive amount to a person who starts with the same endowment as 
yours, but without the intention of receiving anything back), the only explanation for transferring a positive sum of 
money to the Second Mover is that the First Mover has the belief that the Second Mover will reciprocate this action 
and transfer back at least the same amount that the First Mover chose to transfer to the Second Mover. We call this 
belief “trust. 
 
Table 1:  Average Amount Transferred by First Movers 
  Americans Croatians 
Same 5.04 9.07 
Other 5.96 7.43 
Uncertain 5.48 6.46 
 
 
Figure 1:  Average Amount Transferred By First Movers By Treatment And By Nationality 
 
Table 1 and Figure 1 (the vertical axis) show the average amount transferred by First Movers, segregated 
both by nationality and by treatment. Overall, Croatians trusted more than the Americans. In all treatments, the 
average amount transferred by Croatians was higher than the average amount transferred by the Americans. By 
combining all three treatments, the difference is highly statistically significant (Mann-Whitney U Test – All 
treatments combined: z = 2.85, p = 0.0037). When the treatments are segregated, the only statistically significant 
difference is for the Same Nationality treatment (Mann-Whitney U Test – Same Nationality: z = 2.91, p = 0.003; 
Other Nationality: z = 0.79, p = 0.433; Uncertain Nationality: z = 0.729, p = 0.473). Therefore, even though, overall, 
Croatians trusted more than the Americans, especially when they interacted with another person from the same 
country, we fail to reject the hypothesis that there is no difference in the levels of trust between Americans and 
Croatians when they are paired with a person from the other country and when they are not sure of the nationality of 
the other person. 
 
The comparison between different treatments, holding the nationality of the subject constant, is also of 
interest. Croatians reduced their levels of trust significantly when they were either paired with an American or in the 
Uncertain Nationality treatment (z = 2.85, p = 0.004, and z = 3.96, p < 0.000, respectively). Americans, on the other 
hand, increased their levels of trust when they were paired either with a Croatian or in the Uncertain Nationality 
treatment, but these differences were not statistically significant (z = 0.70, p = 0.48, and z = 0.37, p = 0.71, 
respectively), so we fail to reject the null hypothesis that there is no change in trusting behavior when Americans 
have the possibility of interacting with a person from another nationality. 
 
  
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Same Nationality  Other Nationality  Uncertain Nationality
Americans
Croatians
International Business & Economics Research Journal – March 2013 Volume 12, Number 3 
2013 The Clute Institute http://www.cluteinstitute.com/  315 
Trustworthiness 
 
It was argued in the Introduction that while the amount transferred by First Movers is a measure of trust, 
the amount transferred back by the Second Mover to the First Mover is a measure of trustworthiness. 
Trustworthiness is defined here as the feeling of reciprocity that is conditional on the amount of trust received by the 
other person. Table 2 and Figure 2 both show the average amount that was transferred back by Second Movers in 
each treatment for each country. In the Same Nationality treatment, the difference in the levels of trustworthiness 
were not statistically significant (z = 1.48, p = 0.14). In the Other Nationality treatment and the Uncertain 
Nationality treatment, Americans were significantly more trustworthy than Croatians (z = 2.35, p = 0.018, and z = 
1.97, p = 0.048, respectively). Combining the three treatments, the difference in the levels of trustworthiness is 
marginally statistically significant (z = 1.744, p = 0.08).  
 
Table 2:  Average Amount Transferred back by Second Movers 
  Americans Croatians 
Same 10.19 11.96 
Other 12.83 5.58 
Uncertain 10.19 4.85 
 
 
Figure 2:  Average Amount Transferred Back By Second Movers By Treatment And By Nationality 
 
These statistically significant differences, however, may not represent the precise levels of trustworthiness 
because the amount that each group of Second Movers received was certainly different. In the Other Nationality 
treatment, for example, Croatians transferred, on average, 7.43 to the Americans, whereas the Americans 
transferred, on average, only 5.96 to the Croatians. One can argue, then, that the fact that Americans transferred 
back more than Croatians is explained by the different levels of trust that they received. We control for this 
possibility by calculating two variables:  1) the average percentage of the initial transfer that was transferred back to 
First Movers by Second Movers and 2) the percentage of Second Movers who transferred back at least the same 
amount that was transferred to them by the First Movers. These two variables are shown in Tables 3 and 4 and 
Figures 3 and 4. Indeed, the results indicate that, with the exception of the Same Nationality Treatment, Americans 
were actually more trustworthy than Croatians. 
 
Table 3:  Percentage Of Amount Transferred By First Movers That Was Transferred Back By Second Movers 
  Americans Croatians 
Same 202.18% 131.86% 
Other 172.68% 93.62% 
Uncertain 154.86% 91.51% 
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Figure 3:  (100 x (Amount Transferred Back/Amount Transferred)) 
 
Table 4:  Percentage Of Second Movers Who Returned At Least The Same Amount That Was Transferred To Them By 
First Movers 
  Americans Croatians 
Same 85.19% 92.59% 
Other 69.57% 42.31% 
Uncertain 69.23% 51.85% 
 
 
Figure 4:  Percentage Of Second Movers Who Returned  
At Least The Same Amount That Was Transferred To Them By First Movers 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The investigation of the determinants of trust and trustworthiness is of significant importance to understand 
how institutions and social norms are maintained in a specific social environment; and, as the world becomes more 
globalized, it seems that these social interactions will be formed by people who never saw each other and might not 
even know the nationality of other participants. This study reported the results of a laboratory experiment that 
compared differences in levels of trust and trustworthiness between subjects from the United States and Croatia. The 
experiment made two novel contributions by allowing subjects to simultaneously interact with participants from the 
other country and by introducing uncertainty about a counterpart’s nationality in order to try to understand what 
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kinds of beliefs are formed when decisions have to be made under these circumstances. The results suggest that 
subjects from these countries did behave differently in the Trust Game.  Whereas Croatians, overall, trusted more 
than Americans, Americans were more trustworthy.  Somewhat surprisingly, Americans were more trustworthy to 
Croatians than they were to Americans and not knowing whether the person you are interacting with is from the 
same nationality as yours or not caused subjects from both countries to behave as if the other person was from a 
different nationality. Given that many different types of experiments have been conducted with the goal of 
understanding social preferences, we think that other experiments that follow the same methodology used in this 
article in a cross-cultural environment would make a significant contribution to the field of behavioral economics. 
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